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A significant global development in the first decade of the 21st Century has been the rise of several nations
hitherto not considered key players in the international scene. The following up and coming nations have recently
been grouped respectively as BRIC and BASIC: Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC); and Brazil, South Africa,
India, and China (BASIC) (Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). Noticeably, the two nations featured in both these
groupings are China and India. China’s and India’s meteoric rise to the global arena, and the sheer magnitude of
their populations, has led some scholars to assert that there is an ‘irresistible’ shift of global power toward Asia,
dubbing this as the ‘Asian Century’ (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 43). And some scholars have gone so far as to coin the
portmanteau ‘Chindia’ to signify the ascendency of these two Asian giants (Ramesh, 2005; Sheth, 2008). In this
article, I begin by examining Ramesh’s (2005) and Sheth’s (2008) definitions of the term Chindia. I then proceed
to situate Chindia according to classical international relations theory of how global peace and prosperity have
been historically attributed to a few strong nations in the world. I then undertake an historical overview of ChinaIndia relations, followed by a brief summary of the commonalities and differences between the two nations.
Finally, I make an assessment whether Chindia is a dream or a possibility.
Chindia and Hegemony in International Relations
Sheth (2008) contended that with the rise of China and India, a fusion may take place between these nations.
Hence Chindia may usher in a new world order, replacing the USA:
[The] kind of rapid rise to economic supremacy now being witnessed in these two nations has happened but once
– in the United States, from roughly 70 years after the Civil War to the end of WW1. It therefore follows that the
bursting of China and India into full economic bloom will have global repercussions – political, social, cultural as
well as economic. These are expected to be in the same order of magnitude as that of America’s hegemony
throughout the 20th Century… (p. 5)
Sheth did not imply imperial designs in Chindia rising. However, it was not ruled out because he saw economic
power as a steppingstone to political power. Ramesh, (2005, 2014), who coined the term Chindia, argued:
Chindia is not an outdated vision, it is actually what the governments of both countries are carrying forward. It is
essential for India to understand China better, and vice versa. There is no reason that India and China should fall
victim to those people who see India and China as natural rivals (2014, para. 12)
Both pundits and investors embraced this somewhat fanciful notion of the two largest nations forming an alliance
that will spell success and stability to Asia and the world. So how would Chindia fit into the international relations
landscape of the world?
Interestingly, Ramesh’s and Sheth’s predilection of Chindia corresponds with international relations scholars who
contend that American hegemony has been declining since the recession of 2007, and project a shift in global
wealth, power and influence from West to East – a trend exemplified by China’s rapid rise to world power status
(Layne, 2012). Apparently, Layne’s depiction of US’s decline was based on the theoretical perspectives of the
classical international relations scholar Parchami (2009), who traced the etymology of the ancient Latin word Pax
(the Roman goddess of peace) to modern times when the term has come to mean long periods of world peace
under the benevolent guidance of a dominant world power. Historically, there have been three such periods: Pax
Romana (the Roman empire, 27 BCE to 14 CE); Pax Britannica (the British Empire, 1815-1914) and Pax

E-International Relations

ISSN 2053-8626

Page 1/9

The Prospect of ‘Chindia’ as a World Power
Written by Jonathan D. James

Americana (the relative peace brought about by USA and her allies post-1945).
Historical Overview of China-India Relations
Although China and India emanate from ancient civilizations and share a common border, there is little historical
evidence of appreciable partnerships between the two nations (Sidhu & Yuan, 2003). Chinese scholars and
priests were known to have visited India to learn more about Buddhism in the first millennium, and this was
reciprocated with Indian scholars visiting China between the first and the eleventh centuries (Sen, 2003). Trade
has been another reason for interactions between the two nations (Sen, 2003). However, it was colonisation that
brought the two together, albeit in negative ways. During the British colonisation of India, the East India Company
produced opium that was sold in China, whose objection to the harmfully addictive product led to the ugly Opium
Wars between China and Great Britain. The first took place from 1839 to 1842, and the second, between 1856
and 1860. China lost both Opium Wars and its defeat was especially severe because it entailed Hong Kong being
surrendered to British control and British citizens granted special commercial privileges (Wang, 2011).
However, a measure of improvement in relations between China and India took place just before the British left
India due to their shared anti-imperial sentiments. Following India’s independence, Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru was cordial towards nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. And even when the Mao
Zedong-led communists defeated the nationalists and formed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949,
India extended formal recognition to the transformed nation. And Nehru’s overtures to the PRC when Zhou Enlai
became the Prime Minister in 1949 are noteworthy (Wang, 2011). Nehru’s famous slogan ‘Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai’
(India and China are brothers) was unprecedented in China-India relations (Wang, 2011). However, this euphoria
of brotherly love between the two nations ended rather abruptly in 1950 as a result of their standoff regarding the
McMahon Line (the boundary drawn quite arbitrarily in the Simla Accord of 1914 to demarcate British India from
Tibet). Whereas Britain and Tibet were bound to this new territorial boundary line, China, contested it because it
encroached on its territory (Wang, 2011). Hence China broke international protocol when its Peoples Liberation
Army (PLA) entered Tibet and claimed sovereignty over the disputed territory that had previously served as a
buffer between India and China. Indian officials observed, ironically, ‘This was the first time we [Indians] came
into direct contact with Han Chinese…we suddenly became neighbours’ (Malik cited in Wang, 2011, p. 450).
In 1959, after Tibet’s failed revolt against China, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tibet’s highest spiritual-cum-political
leader, fled to India. India’s Prime Minister Nehru offered the city of Dharamsala as a location for the exiled
Tibetan government – thus adding stress to the already-strained bilateral relations between China and India
(Wang, 2011). And in 1962, widespread disagreement and uncertainty about border issues led to military
confrontation and a full-scale war on 20 October 1962. The Chinese army in a surprise attack expelled Indian
soldiers from the Dhola post in the border’s eastern sector. Clearly, India was unprepared for a war of this
magnitude and grateful that China called it off in the middle of November of the same year after she gained back
her claimed territory; but India essentially lost her national pride (Sidhu & Yuan, 2003). Scholars agree that the
1962 war took its toll and ‘cast a long shadow over the Indo-Chinese relationship, and India’s defeat…indelibly
colored [its] perceptions of China’ (Sidhu & Yuan, 2003, p. 15).
China’s successful nuclear tests in 1964 deepened Indian misgivings. From 1962 to 1976, China and India were
involved in a tense cold war – thawed by an exchange of ambassadors in 1976 (Sidhu & Yuan, 2003). Other
testing events for the China-India relations included China’s entry into the United Nations in 1971, Indian nuclear
tests in 1998, and China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001. China’s opposition to India obtaining
permanency status in the UN Security Council was another point of contention. Hence, ancient allegiance and
recent rivalry have provided the historical backdrop to our understanding of contemporary China-India relations.
Commonalities and Partnerships
Geographically, China and India share a common location in Asia. And they are the two most populous nations in
the world, with India predicted to overtake China in population growth before 2050 (Ritchie, 2019). Both nations
have a long history and a rich civilisation that dates thousands of years. They also have deep historical
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connections: India is the birthplace of Gautama Buddha (the founder of Buddhism) and the conduit for the
amazing spread of Buddhism to China and East Asia where more adherents to Buddha live than in India. Both are
members of the BRICS forum, the BASIC group of nations and the G-20 (a grouping of the world’s largest
advanced and emerging economies) (Petersen & Jungbluth, 2019).
Significantly, both nations share a sense of humiliation over the way they have been treated by Western countries
with imperial designs (Vieira & Alden, 2011). Both have adapted aspects of the Westphalian understanding of
state sovereignty and non-intervention by upholding a secure world order through laws enforced by their
respective political systems (Vieira & Alden, 2011; Wang, 2012). China is currently India’s fourth largest export
market (Arora & Saxena, 2018) with bilateral trade in 2017 having reached an all-time high of US$84.44 billion,
according to China (Arora & Saxena, 2018). India and China have much in common, but divergences remain, as
elaborated in the following section.
Differences and Obstacles
Politics
China is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and espouses a political ideology that blends communism
with capitalism and pragmatism. India is the world’s largest democracy with a parliamentary system and
bureaucracy adopted and adapted from the British who colonised the nation for 250 years.
China’s political system, despite criticisms of its totalitarianism, has generated extraordinary economic
development and reduction in poverty. Its road, rail and other infrastructure is way ahead of that of India, which is
bogged down by bureaucracy and deep seated cultural and religious issues (Harris-White, 2012).
Language and culture
Mao Zedong unified the nation by introducing Mandarin as the official language (Karl, 2010). India celebrates its
linguistic and cultural diversity because it is home to 1,650 mother tongues, although Hindi is the official language
(Mallikarjun, 2004).
China destroyed its old social structures (such as the literati, the landlords) through two revolutions. On the other
hand, India has never had a social revolution, and class structures such as the caste system remain part of its
social life. Harris-White (2012) has proposed that a semi-feudal social structure is less inclined to adopt a form of
capitalism and embark on the reduction of poverty.
China has been influenced by the teachings of Confucius (Page, 2015), which promotes five cardinal relationships
(Wu-lun,): father – son; emperor – subject; husband – wife; older – younger brothers; and friend-to-friend (Chang
& Holt, 1991). This is the basis of interpersonal relationships in China today, although the communist ideology
dictates life in China and can overrule deeply embedded Confucian ideology when necessary. For example,
recently, the Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs in the state of Guangzhou issued a notification that the
government is giving ‘incentives and cash prizes’ to anyone who reports on ‘illegal religious activities’ in the
city, such as ‘underground community meetings, catechism, or interactions with foreign religious personnel’
(Zhicheng, 2019, para. 1). This opens the door for friend to turn against friend, thus undermining the fifth code of
mutual piety in Confucian thinking.
Whereas India’s Hindu caste system has contributed to its social disparities in education and income, her
democratic processes provide some form of protection for the civil liberties of minorities. India is behind China
militarily and economically, but Hinduism seems to be more supportive of differences: ‘It is the nature of the
Hindu religion to be tolerant and, in its own curious way, permissive,’ writes British historian Paul Johnson (2004,
para. 2).
Through the eyes of a Chinese advisor in a novel, the American travel writer Paul Theroux (1998) gave us a
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glimpse of his understanding of how Chinese culture affects politics:
The philosophy of learning from foreigners was spelled out in the nineteenth century by Feng Gui Fen. He
regarded all foreigners as barbarians but said it was necessary to use them…A few barbarians should be
employed, and Chinese who are good in using their minds should be selected to receive instruction so that in turn
they may teach many craftsmen…we should use the instruments of the barbarians, but not adopt the ways of the
barbarians. We should use them so that we can repel them (Theroux,1988, p. 320)
Economics
China’s economy has grown at a faster rate than India’s partly because China’s manufacturing boom has been
based primarily on foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade agreements rather than its encouragement of
homegrown entrepreneurship. In 1990 China produced less than 3% of global manufacturing output; this figure
now has jumped to nearly 25%: ‘China produces about 80% of the world’s air-conditioners, 70% of its mobile
phones, and 60% of its shoes’ (Bacon, 2015, para. 1).
In contrast, India has adopted a policy of encouraging and creating world class domestic companies rather than
being the global factory that China is described as (Lomas, 2017). In so doing, India has birthed companies with
‘cutting-edge’ technology and ‘knowledge-based industries’ such as Infosys and Wipro as well as pharmaceutical
and biotechnology ‘powerhouses’ like Ranbaxy and Dr. Reddy’s Labs. (Huang & Khanna, 2003, para. 3).
However, China is catching up with the creation of its own competitive companies such as Huawei Technologies,
Haier Group and Lenovo Group.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to strengthen the CCP’s economic leadership through a broad
program of infrastructure building throughout China’s neighbouring regions. The BRI is clearly President Xi
Jinping’s jewel in the crown to showcase China’s power and economic capabilities to the world. The scale of the
project is colossal and includes more than 100 countries, with more expected to join. The project has received
praise but also strong criticism, with some calling it ‘debt trap diplomacy’ (Carminati, 2019, para. 2). An example
of this is the case of Hambantota (a town in the Southern province of Sri Lanka), where the local ‘government
was forced to sign the port away on a 99-year lease after failing to repay Chinese loans’ (Carminati, 2019).
This criticism has been strongly contested by the Chinese government and its tightly controlled media; however,
unfavourable news reports worldwide have induced many to distrust the Chinese government’s motives. Overall,
the rhetoric and mixed signals about BRI have been counterproductive and, according to Carminati: ‘A
reassessment of how China wants to present itself to the world should come sooner than later, as it takes a long
time to build a trustworthy reputation and much less time to tarnish it. China’s spotlight is now; how long it will last
is yet to be determined’ (Carminati, 2019, para. 10).
India‘s Look East policy, which later became the Act East Policy under Prime Minister Modi, is an initiative to
develop strategic economic relations with the nations of South East Asia commensurate with China’s BRI,
although India’s reactive policy is less extensive than China’s. Time will tell whether these two initiatives will
collide with each other or converge to create stability.
Defence and International Relations
India has looked more to the USA in the 20th Century for a new strategic military alliance, which is often described
by US scholars as a ‘healthy relationship’ (Ganguly & Scobell, 2005, pp. 37–43). Today’s US-India ties can be
understood by the sentiments outlined in a speech given by Senator John F. Kennedy in 1959, just before he
became President of the United States:
No struggle in the world today deserves more of our time and attention than that which now grips the attention of
all Asia. I am not referring to the unhappy tide of events in Tibet…I am referring to another struggle equally fierce
but less obvious – less in the headlines but far more significant in the long run. And that is the struggle between
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India and China for leadership of the East, for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to demonstrate whose
way of life is the better (John F Kennedy Website, para. 2)
Senator Kennedy’s sentiments shaped US foreign policy under his administration and in successive US
administrations. The USA’s ‘pivoting to Asia’ policy seemed designed to strategically ‘rebalance’ the Asia
Pacific region, in keeping with its perception of China as a threat. According to a Chinese scholar, one of the
consequences of the strong US – India partnership was India’s increasing boldness in its stand on its border
issues with China especially in the Aksai Chin, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh regions (Zhang Li, 2009).
On the other hand, China’s ties with Pakistan – an arch enemy of India – appeared to counterbalance the USIndia alliance in South Asia. And the ‘cat and mouse’ game has continued with China bypassing India and the
US to build an energy corridor from Balouchistan (Pakistan) to Karakorum (Mongolia), despite Pakistan’s
notorious instability. However, the implementation of this corridor has encountered several difficulties (Chen,
2009). These include the politically tenuous situation in neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran as well as domestic
issues in Pakistan (Hassain, 2017).
Then there is the Taiwan factor (China considers Taiwan part of her territory) in the power balance struggle
between China and India. India is ranked among the high-priority countries in Taiwan’s new South-bound policy
that focuses on strengthening ties with eighteen South-East and South-Asian countries (Singh, 2019).
Presumably, Taiwan’s engagement with India is a display of sovereignty and resistance in the face of pressure
from the Chinese mainland (Chen, 2015).
Hence the East Asian partnerships with the respective two giants, and with the US, have added to the complexity
of the region. From the Chinese perspective, the multi-lateral military and trade partnerships in the Indo-Pacific
region between the USA, Japan, India, Australia and other allies is an extension of the long-standing policy of the
strategic containment of China (Sun Yang, 2016). And from the viewpoint of the US and its allies the defence
spending by China justifies this policy of containment. India’s military expenditure per capita was US$9.7 billion in
1991 and US$38.1 billion in 2013, compared to China’s US$8.7 billion in 1991 and US$138 billion in 2013 (SIPRI
Military Expenditure Website).
Maritime plans
According to Lee (2002), the breakup of the Soviet Union eased China’s anxiety of a land war and enabled it to
redirect its resources into modernising its naval fleet and expanding its maritime diplomacy around the globe. And
in conjunction with this development, China has put the world on notice of its territorial claims in the Spratly and
Diaoyutui (Senkaku) Islands and the South China Sea (Lee, 2002).
India perceives China’s advancements in Asia as a threat to its security at sea and on land, particularly since
China has developed close ties with Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Meanwhile, China is anxious about
India’s chosen interests in East Asia.
Borders
Border issues between China and India are a nagging problem as the two bicker over their shared 4,056 km
frontier. Bilateral discussions have been ongoing for decades and will likely continue. Discussions of late,
however, have been accompanied by a glimmer of hope in the form of the leaders’ firm pledge to find a peaceful
end to the issue (Economic Times Website, 2019).
Analysis
China’s consuming ambition to be respected in the international sphere in the latter half of the 20th Century (and
into the 21st Century), can be attributed to historical reasons. China’s theory of foreign relations started in premodern days, when it was considered the Middle Kingdom (Shambaugh, 2005), and the centre of the civilised
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world. But the country’s defeat in the Opium Wars with Britain and subsequent clashes with Japan have been
deeply humiliating. Hence China’s endeavour to ‘rejuvenate’ and be returned to its rightful status as a
superpower.
Though not as pronounced, India also has strong political ambitions. However, at the risk of oversimplification,
China appears to be the instigator and leader, India the follower and reactor. This was illustrated by China
entering Indian territory to claim back its disputed border in 1962, and India reacting to this invasion; also, with
China joining the nuclear arms ‘club’ in 1964 and India following suit in 1998.
Economically, the two nations complement each other, with China providing the hardware (factories and
infrastructure) and India, significant parts of the software (e.g. IT, business outsourcing and financial services). On
paper this seems like the potential synergy for some form of Chindia. However, the relationship between the two
is far too complex and the differences too weighty to inspire contemplation of a strong alliance in the immediate
future. Both will continue to grow separately and restrict any collaboration to utilitarian and pragmatic purposes.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted to give an historical and futurist overview of the political and economic relationship
between China and India. Within the first half of this century, these two rising giants have emerged
simultaneously, and it now seems certain that they will impact on the dynamics of the US hegemonic framework –
but how exactly remains to be seen. While making their mark on the world scene, China and India must constantly
watch each other’s backs, mindful of their history of wars, border issues, rivalry, and essential differences.
‘Different beds, same dreams’ a description used by Ramesh (2005) may be a useful analogy for China and
India today. Both countries have similar ambitions and are poised to become world economic power houses.
In the short-term, the containment of China will be the major policy objective for the US and her allies together
with India. However, in the long term, India and China may develop a less confrontative, more nuanced and
productive relationship. The level of economic cooperation between the two nations is an encouraging sign, but
until more deep-seated change occurs, the elephant and the dragon will engage ever so cautiously. And, while
the speculation about Chindia may continue, one thing is certain: Pax Americana is under notice and the current
unilateral model of international relations (when one nation is the major power) seems destined to be replaced by
a multi-polar model, with China and India as key players in the emerging geopolitical architecture of our world.
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